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The FIU-SOUTHCOM Academic Partnership 
Strategic Cultures Assessments 
 
Florida International University’s Applied Research Center (FIU ARC), in collaboration 
with the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and FIU’s Latin American 
and Caribbean Center (LACC), has recently formed the FIU-SOUTHCOM Academic 
Partnership.  The partnership entails FIU providing the highest quality research-based 
knowledge to further explicative understanding of the political, strategic, and cultural 
dimensions of state behavior and foreign policy. This goal will be accomplished by 
employing a strategic culture approach. The initial phase of strategic culture assessments 
consists of a year-long research program that focuses on developing a standard analytical 
framework to identify and assess the strategic culture of ten Latin American countries. 
FIU will facilitate professional presentations of the following ten countries over the 
course of one year:  Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, 
Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina. In addition, a findings report on the impact of Islam and 
Muslims within Latin America will be produced.  
 
The overarching purpose of the project is two-fold:  to generate a rich and dynamic base 
of knowledge pertaining to the political, social, and strategic factors that influence state 
behavior; and to contribute to SOUTHCOM’s Socio-Cultural Dynamics (SCD) Program.  
Utilizing the notion of strategic culture, SOUTHCOM has commissioned FIU ARC to 
conduct country studies in order to explain how states comprehend, interpret, and 
implement national security policy vis-à-vis the international system. 
 
SOUTHCOM defines strategic culture as follows: “the combination of internal and 
external influences and experiences – geographic, historical, cultural, economic, political 
and military – that shape and influence the way a country understands its relationship to 
the rest of the world, and how a state will behave in the international community.”  FIU 
will identify and expound upon the strategic and cultural factors that inform the rationale 
behind the perceptions and behavior of select states in the present political and security 
climate by analyzing demography, history, regional customs, traditions, belief systems, 
and other cultural and historical influences that have contributed to the development of a 
particular country’s current security rationale and interpretation of national security.   
 
To meet the stated goals, FIU ARC will host a series of professional workshops in 
Miami.  These workshops bring subject matter experts from all over the US and Latin 
America together to explore and discuss a country’s specific history, geography, culture, 
economic, political, and military climates vis-à-vis strategic culture.  At the conclusion of 



















The following Venezuela Findings Report, authored by Dr. Harold Trinkunas, is the 
product of a working group held in Miami on June 5, 2009, which included 11 prominent 
academic and private sector experts in Venezuelan history, culture, geography, 
economics, politics, and military affairs. 
 
 
The views expressed in this findings report are those of the author and do not necessarily 
reflect the official policy or position of the US Government, US Department of Defense, 
US Southern Command, FIU ARC, or Florida International University. 
 
 
On behalf of FIU-ARC, we wish to acknowledge and thank all of the participants for 
their contributions, which made the Venezuelan Strategic Culture workshop a 
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 Venezuela has not fought in an interstate conflict since its independence in 1830. 
Generally speaking, traditional strategic culture is inward looking, defensive, and 
prefers to avoid the use of military means to solve international disputes.  
 
 The political-ideological orientation guiding the Chávez administration’s foreign 
policy is misaligned with Venezuela’s traditional strategic culture. This creates 
internal friction during international crises because a large majority of the 
Venezuelan population rejects war unless it is in the defense of the national 
territory. 
 
Geographic and Historical Influences on Strategic Culture 
 
 Venezuelans view their border with Colombia as the main area of vulnerability. 
The Amazon borders with Brazil and Guyana are viewed as remote, nearly 
impenetrable, and not conducive to military operations. The Caribbean Basin has 
not typically been viewed as a zone of threats, but rather an avenue for trade. 
 
 Inspired by the example of Simón Bolivar, the liberator of northern South 
America, the national strategic culture supports an active role for Venezuela in 
shaping international and regional affairs.  
 
 The violent civil wars that wracked Venezuela in the 19th century produced a 
strategic culture that privileges internal stability over external security.   
 
 Since the twentieth century, Venezuela’s access to resources from oil production 
has reinforced its preference for diplomatic and economic means to achieve its 
international objectives. It has also created an enduring dependence on imported 
technology and materiel, particularly in the defense sphere, which undermines its 
capacity to use military means to influence international affairs. 
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Keepers of Strategic Culture 
 
 Strategic culture at the elite level in Venezuela has historically been the province 
of the armed forces, the national oil industry, and the traditional political parties. 
These elites share a concern for internal stability. Although there was 
disagreement over how best to take advantage of oil rents, all supported the 
international rules of the game and worked within the system to achieve positive 
change. 
 
 Traditional elite keepers of national strategic culture in Venezuela have been 
sidelined, purged, or dismantled during the Chavez regime. They no longer pose a 
significant check to President Hugo Chavez vis-à-vis his decision-making process. 
Rather, foreign policy is guided by an anti-imperialist, anti-neoliberal economics, 
and anti-globalization vision that views the United States as the main threat to the 
Bolivarian revolution and Venezuelan sovereignty. 
 
 Strategic culture at the mass level, as reflected by public opinion polls, has 
changed little during the Chavez regime despite a concerted effort to win 
adherents to the regime’s ideology. The Venezuela public is still deeply pacifist 
and rejects the idea of the United States as a significant threat.  
 
Enduring Rivalries and Emerging Challenges 
 
 Venezuelan strategic culture still sees Colombia as the main peer-competitor. 
Venezuela traditionally seeks to create a regional balance of power that deters 
Colombia. This remains a challenge for the Chávez administration. 
 
 Venezuela strategic culture has no historical element of anti-Americanism (unlike 
other Caribbean states). The Venezuelan public is a major consumer of American 
cultural products and generally favors good relations with the United States. This 
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runs counter to the Chávez administration’s international orientation and its 
efforts to mobilize the population for national defense against the United States. 
 
 The rapidly rising power of Brazil is a challenge to Venezuelan aspirations to 
assume a regional leadership role. However, it would be difficult to rally the 
Venezuelan public to address this challenge, given the political orientation of the 
Lula administration and the absence of any threat perception regarding Brazil. 
 
 Holding together the Bolivarian alliance in moments of crisis will most likely 
generate domestic political difficulties for the Chávez administration. Reflecting 
an inward looking strategic culture, the public rejects the use of military force to 
support President Chávez’s regional allies, and it is suspicious of large amounts of 
economic assistance to other countries. 
 
Change and Continuity in Venezuelan Strategic Culture 
 
 To the extent that it is confrontational, ideologically driven, or seeks non-
traditional alliances, Venezuela’s contemporary foreign policy is generally not 
reflective of its traditional strategic culture. However, contemporary policy does 
reflect a history of diplomatic and economic activism designed to improve 
Venezuela’s international position. 
 
 Among the general public, Venezuela’s strategic culture has changed little under 
the Chavez regime. However, the breakdown of political and institutional checks 
on presidential power in Venezuela has allowed President Chavez to disregard 
traditional strategic culture at the elite level. 
 
 The inability to significantly influence mass strategic culture represents 
vulnerability for the Chavez administration since the general public still 
overwhelmingly rejects a confrontational, hostile foreign policy. To the extent 
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that the regime still depends on electoral victories for legitimacy and power, this 




 At first glance, it is difficult to see the strategic culture of Venezuela in action 
since it has not fought a war with a foreign adversary since its independence from Gran 
Colombia in 1830. However, by looking at a broad concept of strategic culture that 
includes non-military sources of national power, we can detect a pattern across time in 
Venezuela’s engagement with the international system. The essential elements of 
Venezuela’s traditional strategic culture are an inward focus on political stability and an 
outward focus on peace. The legacy for Venezuelans of the wars of independence from 
Spain in the early nineteenth century, in which their troops played a key role across 
northern South America, is a sense of nationalism, a desire for an autonomous role on the 
international stage, and a conviction that Venezuela can be a positive force for regional 
integration and freedom.1 Its role as a leading oil exporter contributes to a belief that 
Venezuela is a wealthy country that has the potential to accomplish great things. This 
sometimes produces an overestimation of its capabilities to accomplish change on the 
international stage. However, the legacy of political turmoil in the nineteenth century is a 
concern for both internal stability as well as the sense that the main threats to security are 
civil wars rather than external conflict. 
Venezuela’s strategic culture at the popular level is essentially defensive with a 
strong bias against war as a mechanism for solving disputes. This strategic culture has 
generally held at the elite level as well, where the key guardians of strategic culture 
within the armed forces, the established political parties, and the national oil company 
have preferred a policy of peaceful engagement with the international community. 
Venezuela’s strategic culture also includes other tendencies, such as nationalism and 
Bolivarianism, which can be harnessed to support a more activist foreign policy. 
This does not mean that the strategic preferences of the Chávez regime follow 
Venezuela’s traditional strategic culture. In fact, this findings report argues that a key 
obstacle to the foreign policy of the current regime is that traditional mass and elite 
strategic cultures do not align with the regime’s ideological preferences. This has led the 
                                                 
1 The content of what is positive for the region has varied depending on the Venezuelan political leadership in charge at 
the time, from the highly anti-Communist agenda of General Marcos Perez Jimenez (1953-58) to the socialism of the 
21st century of President Hugo Chávez. Marvin Astrada, “Statecraft & Venezuela: Strategic Culture and National 
Security Policy,” paper prepared for Venezuela Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, 
June 5, 2009. 
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Chávez regime to engage in a systematic attempt to establish control over key state 
institutions to enforce an ideological orientation more in line with its activist international 
security interests and policy. 
 This report will first examine the geographical and historical antecedents that 
have shaped Venezuelan strategic culture towards its current orientation. This includes an 
examination of the formation of key institutions and features of the state that influence 
and sustain this culture. The report will then turn to an analysis of the current guardians 
of Venezuela’s strategic culture and their attitudes towards the use of power in the 
international system. Finally, this report will look at the challenges posed by Venezuela’s 
traditional strategic culture for the Chávez regime and the elements of continuity in 
Venezuela’s strategic culture. It will argue that the Chávez regime has made progress in 
embedding its ideology into key state institutions as a way of overcoming the traditional 
strategic culture orientation, but this has not translated into significant changes in public 
opinion about strategic issues. The disconnection between regime ideology and mass 
strategic culture is a potential critical vulnerability for the Chávez regime in future 
international confrontations. This vulnerability may be mitigated by the progressively 
authoritarian cast the regime has taken from 2006 onward, but as long as elections remain 
an important feature of President Chávez’s hold on power, Venezuela’s strategic culture 
will inhibit some of the more radical dimensions of Chavista foreign policy. 
Geographic Considerations in Determining Venezuelan Strategic 
Culture 
 
 The three key enduring geographic factors shaping Venezuela’s strategic culture 
are its extended Caribbean maritime border, its historically impenetrable Amazon border 
with Brazil, and the relative vulnerability of its Colombian flank. In addition, emerging 
from the Spanish colonial period and the brief experiment with the Gran Colombia 
(Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador united in a single state until 1830), Venezuela has 
viewed its borders as poorly defined, insecure, and vulnerable to encroachment by 
neighboring powers. Geologically speaking, the abundance of oil and other mineral 
resources have been key elements in shaping Venezuela’s twentieth century development 
as a state, and inform its population’s views of the country’s wealth and capabilities. 
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Taken together, Venezuela’s key strategic preoccupation has been how to preserve, 
augment, and secure it autonomy and wealth, deter potential invaders, and prevent further 
loss of its national territory. 
 The physical impenetrability of its border with Brazil has led Venezuela to 
historically focus on threats by land from Colombia, which has been the main invasion 
route into Venezuela for most of its independent history. While there has not been a 
major state-to-state conflict with Colombia during this period, ongoing disputes over 
maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Venezuela provide a ready-made excuse for either 
government to increase international tensions. In addition, historically, most “invasions” 
by Venezuelan political exiles intending to change the regime in Caracas entered via the 
Colombia-Venezuela border, and the combination of state-to-state tensions and political 
as well as security concerns has, over time, led to the deployment of most of Venezuela’s 
military assets and infrastructure along the axis between Caracas and the border. The 
ongoing territorial dispute with Guyana, where British influence is perceived to have led 
to the loss of a major and potentially very rich part of the national territory, illustrates 
another historical element of Venezuela’s strategic culture, namely, the fear of being 
taken advantage of by and losing precious resources to great powers. Of all its borders, 
the Caribbean has been perceived as a highway for Venezuela’s trade and as a natural 
area of influence for Venezuela rather than as a zone of threats. However, Venezuela has 
historically paid some attention to influencing international affairs in the Caribbean 
Basin. Taken together, Venezuela’s historical geography has led it to consider the 
Colombia-Venezuela border as the main potential arena for military conflict, and to 
consider Colombia as the main peer-competitor against which it plans, equips, and 
trains.2 
Historical Antecedents for Venezuelan Strategic Culture 
 Three key elements of Venezuela’s history shape its strategic culture: the role of 
Simón Bolivar and the legacy of the wars for independence from Spain; the violent 
century of civil wars that followed independence; and the discovery and 
                                                 




commercialization of oil during the twentieth century. Simón Bolívar’s legacy entails a 
sense of nationalism, even national greatness, and of brotherhood with other Latin 
American republics. The violence of the nineteenth century has left an enduring 
conviction that the main threat in Venezuela stems from internal sociopolitical and 
economic factors.  Oil has shaped Venezuela’s strategic culture by strengthening the 
economic and diplomatic elements of power and weakening the development of an 
autonomous military capability. This section considers each of these arguments in turn. 
Simón Bolívar and the Venezuelan epic view of its independence struggle are the 
best point of departure for understanding Venezuelan strategic culture. Since his death in 
1830, Venezuelans have propagated a cult of personality around Simón Bolívar as the 
hero-leader-messiah of the wars of independence from Spain. The general population 
devotes little practical thought to Simón Bolívar’s actual role in the independence of 
Spain’s American colonies or the evolution of his political philosophy; he is simply 
considered a great man—indeed, an icon that symbolizes the idealism and other positive 
cultural traits of Venezuela as well as Latin America as a whole—with which only 
positive things are associated in the popular imagination. In part, this view stems from 
Simón Bolívar’s very complex role in the multiple campaigns for independence across 
South America (which lasted almost two decades). During this period he adopted 
multiple political philosophies and military strategies that ranged from extremely radical 
to very conservative. For the general public, the details seem rather unimportant; what 
matters is the legend: Simón Bolívar as a great liberator is a centerpiece of civic 
education in schools, his portrait hangs in most public spaces, and nearly all cities name 
their significant public space after him. Simón Bolívar’s legacy is not analyzed or 
understood by the general public, but rather is simply accepted as the founding of a meta-
narrative of the republic’s social and political identity.3  
Certain key interpretations of the founding narrative of Simón Bolívar have been 
handed down through Venezuelan history and are embedded in strategic culture. The first 
message is that Venezuelans have a capacity for national greatness and can play an active 
role in affecting the course of history to a disproportionate extent. This is particularly true 
                                                 
3 “Continuidad y Cambio en la Cultura Estratégica Venezolana,” paper prepared for Venezuela Strategic Culture 
Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, June 5, 2009. 
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when it comes to intraregional politics in Latin America, where the legacy of Simón 
Bolívar leads Venezuelans to believe that their country should play a special and active 
role to forge regional consensus. This perspective frequently leads them to overestimate 
their country’s relative capabilities. The second key interpretation is that Simón Bolívar 
was a genius by which every contemporary politician suffers in comparison.  Bolívar 
liberated five countries, founded political systems, raised armies, wrote constitutions, and 
served as both a political and military leader across the region. Every Venezuelan leader 
since the founding of the republic has tried to live up to Bolívar’s legend, feats, and 
significance. This has created a certain tendency for Venezuelan leaders to reference 
Bolívar (“What would Bolívar do?”) when justifying their policies.4 The third element 
that affects strategic culture is a sense that Venezuelans only fight wars to liberate other 
peoples rather than to conquer; this mindset is derived from the consistent message in 
Simón Bolívar’s philosophy favoring liberty and unity for the peoples of South America.5 
The fourth key understanding is that other Spanish-speaking Latin American states are 
not enemies or potential enemies, but rather sister-republics that the great Liberator once 
tried to bring together for the common good. This reduces the competitive, potentially 
confrontational “us versus them” element in the way Venezuelans view other Latin 
American states, and it provides a foundation for public receptiveness to ideas of regional 
integration and cooperation. 
Venezuela experienced a long, violent nineteenth century from the breakup of 
Gran Colombia (1830) to the dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gómez (1908-1935). During 
this period, Venezuela had almost no discernible international policy or strategic outlook 
because it was constantly wracked by internal conflicts. Even before its independence 
from Spain, Venezuela’s colonial government was one of the least prosperous and least 
secure from internal and external threats among the American colonies. The wars of 
independence had devastating demographic consequences for Venezuela, including the 
decimation of its educated elite classes. It very nearly devolved into a race war as Spanish 
and Criollo authorities competed to mobilize and incorporate traditionally excluded 
                                                 
4 However, given the overall length of and lack of coherence in the body of work and experience that Bolívar left 
behind, almost anything can be justified. 
5 “Continuidad y Cambio en la Cultura Estratégica Venezolana,” paper prepared for Venezuela Strategic Culture 
Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, June 5, 2009. 
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classes (those of African or indigenous descent) into the war effort. This has led to 
consistent fear of instability and revolution among the elite classes.6 This state of affairs 
has been reinforced by a historical pattern of violent power transfers between leaders of 
succeeding generations. Since independence in the 1820s, every successive generation 
has witnessed some major civil war or political catastrophe that has wiped out the 
previous generation of elites, usually violently. This is driven by a center-periphery 
dynamic within Venezuela that concentrates wealth at the center and creates incentives 
for peripheral elites to seize the capital to gain control of resources. Different warlords 
within the national territory, generally either from the Andes, the plains in southern 
Venezuela, or the central region around Caracas, constantly fought for leadership and/or 
autonomy. This did not end until the dictatorship of General Juan Vicente Gómez who 
defeated local warlords and pacified the national territory and population.  
The overall impact on the strategic culture of Venezuela’s violent nineteenth 
century was to create a sense that internal security is more important than external 
security. It also left a long-standing distaste for violent conflict and civil war amongst 
Venezuelans. Another very important consequence of the Gómez dictatorship was to 
demilitarize the general population and concentrate military power in a new national 
army. Unlike many of their neighbors, this means that Venezuelans generally do not have 
either experience or the historical memory of using the military to solve political disputes 
by insurrection or violence (and the failure of the 1960s insurgency seemed to confirm 
that for most Venezuelans). The Gómez era has embedded into the national strategic 
culture an attitude that security and defense is the province of the military rather than that 
of average citizens.7 
 A more recent reinterpretation of the past provides  a sense that the frequent bouts 
of internal instability, particularly during the nineteenth century, led Venezuela to lose 
control of its vulnerable borders and created a situation in which  stronger outside powers 
such as Colombia and Great Britain (via its colony in Guyana) were able to encroach on 
its national territory. The major territorial dispute Venezuela has with Guyana is a legacy 
                                                 
6 Carlos Peñaloza, “La Geopolítica Cósmica,” prepared for Venezuela Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida 
International University, Miami, June 5, 2009. 
7 Domingo Irwin and Ingrid Micett, Caudillos, Militares y Poder: una historia del pretorianismo en Venezuela, 
Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, Caracas, 2008. 
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of this period, although Venezuelan governments have preferred pursuing this dispute via 
international legal mechanisms rather than by force. The bottom line is that Venezuelans 
connect internal disorder with international vulnerability. However, this also leads 
Venezuelans to react in a jingoistic and nationalist fashion whenever they feel the 
territorial integrity of their county is threatened.8  
 The third important factor in the development of Venezuela’s strategic culture is 
dominated by the discovery, exploitation, and commercialization of oil during the 
twentieth century. Oil, by its very nature, tied Venezuela into the international system in 
a particular way: it transformed Venezuela into a major exporter of energy as well as a 
major importer of technology, capital, and almost every other imaginable good. When oil 
was first commercially exploited during the 1920s in Venezuela, international oil 
companies (British, U.S. and Dutch) played a dominant role in setting up the rules of the 
game. The efforts of the international oil companies greatly empowered the state since 
they ensured that the central government would control the revenues from oil production. 
On the one hand, this reinforced the conviction among political elites that the shortest 
route to obtaining, retaining, and exercising political power was to seize control of the 
central government as the shortest route to access the nation’s resources. On the other 
hand, the great increase in state revenue derived from oil made establishing mechanisms 
for a peaceful transfer of power between different elites extremely difficult. The results 
have been constant political turmoil, the perpetual renovation of national elites every 
generation through frequently violent episodes, and the perpetuation of a weak elite class 
in Venezuela.9  
One major impact of the development of an oil-based rentier economy on 
strategic culture is an enduring concern with the international rules of the game. 
Specifically, the central strategic preoccupation of the Venezuelan government since the 
twentieth century has been how to extract more and more resources from the international 
                                                 
8 John D. Martz, “National Security and Politics: The Colombian-Venezuelan Border,” Journal of Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs 30.4 (Winter 1988-1989): 117-138. 
9 It is worth noting that even the democratic period of 1958-98 only saw the alternation of power within a political elite; 
the parties Accion Democratica (Social Democrat) and COPEI (Christian Democrat)  had come to mutual agreement to 
exclude all other competitors for power. It is those very excluded competitors that eventually achieved power under 
President Hugo Chávez and have now marginalized the previously dominant political elite. See David J. Myers, 
“SOUTHCOM Project on Venezuelan Strategic Culture,” prepared for Venezuela Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida 
International University, Miami, June 5, 2009. 
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system, both through the sale of energy products and by redefining the rules of the game 
so as to produce greater rents for the state. Not by force, since Venezuelan elites have 
understood they could never contend with the great powers that controlled the system, but 
through diplomacy designed to produce strategic alliances with other developing states in 
similar positions, such as the states that eventually formed OPEC. In fact, the resources 
they derived from oil rents made it possible for political elites to influence the 
international system diplomatically, through the use of petrodollars, in a way that would 
not have normally been possible for a small state such as Venezuela. 
  The other major impact on Venezuela’s strategic culture produced by oil is the 
undermining of the economic and technological base of the state and fostering of an 
import-based development pattern. Plainly put, oil is such a dominant source of wealth 
that it has a tendency to drown out almost all other productive endeavors. Beyond the 
almost trite reference to the impact of ‘Dutch Disease’ on the Venezuelan economy, the 
concentration of most wealth in the hands of the state has oriented the population towards 
access to the state as the main source of political power and personal enrichment. It also 
leads the population to perceive the state as wealthy and to overestimate Venezuela’s 
national power. This has produced a predilection for populism and statism among 
citizens.10  
When it comes to strategic culture, the development of a rentier political economy 
has meant that it is almost always easier to import a product, technology, or idea than to 
produce it domestically. This has extended even to the importation of people, with a large 
number of refugees and immigrants from Europe arriving in the wake of the Spanish 
Civil War and the Second World War (7% of the population was foreign born in 1961).11 
Periodically, the Venezuelan government has attempted to reverse this trend by investing 
in domestic industrialization, sponsoring study abroad for its youth, and expanding higher 
education. However, with the exception of some important technological research 
programs associated with the national oil enterprises during the 1980s and 1990s, 
Venezuela has been a net importer of technology. This is especially true in the military 
                                                 
10 Roberto Garcia Prince, “Origins of Strategic Culture,” prepared for Venezuela Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida 
International University, Miami, June 5, 2009. Also Astrada 2009. For more on Venezuela’s rentier political economy, 
see Terry L. Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States, University of California Press, 1997. 
11 Judith Ewell, “Venezuela since 1930,” in The Cambridge History of Latin America, Vol. VIII. The Cambridge 
University Press, 1991, p. 749. 
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arena. The national army founded by Juan Vicente Gómez in 1910 was originally trained 
and educated by a Prussian-influenced Chilean military mission. Since World War II, the 
dominant influence has been the United States and its NATO allies. Even under the 
Chávez administration, military doctrine and technology have been almost entirely 
imported from Russia, Cuba, and Iran.12 The lack of an autonomous technological base 
and a dependence on imports is a major weakness for Venezuela and undermines its 
ability to develop a serious military capability. This has a profound effect on strategic 
culture in that Venezuela has a predilection to engage in an activist foreign policy, yet 
faces a number of impediments and shortcomings to supporting such a policy.13 
 The general tendency to import everything has accentuated the center-periphery 
tension within Venezuela and reinforced the fear of internal conflict. Given that the 
national government in Caracas controls most of the country’s wealth, and the state tends 
to import almost everything, the tendency over time is for the center to develop a more 
cosmopolitan outlook than the rest of Venezuela. It is much more exposed to the 
international intellectual, technological, and cultural currents of modernity. This has 
produced a split between the countryside and the cities, with the countryside being 
considered the repository of authentic Venezuelan culture. Most of the generational 
leadership turmoil that Venezuela has experienced has been driven by center-periphery 
conflicts.14 The constant renovation of the national leadership has tended to prevent the 
formation of dominant elites in Venezuela and frequently interrupted the development of 
strategic culture or tradition that was more outwardly focused. 
Keepers of Strategic Culture 
Modern Venezuela has both a specific strategic culture that is embedded into key 
elite institutions, and a diffuse mass strategic culture that shares certain understandings 
about the use of force and the role of Venezuela in the world. The key state institutions 
                                                 
12 Harold Trinkunas, “From Center Stage to Revolutionary Subordnation?: The Fuerza Armada Bolivariana in the 
Times of Chávez,” paper prepared for FLACSO Chile seminar, “Militares y Política,” Quito, Ecuador, 26-27 October. 
13 See Jorge I. Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba’s Foreign Policy, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1989).  
14 One of the observers in this project noted that the Chávez administration publicly represents itself as more 
authentically Venezuelan than its opposition. Chávez himself comes from a peripheral area of Venezuela, the Llanos. It 




that have historically acted as guardians of strategic culture are the armed forces and 
Petroleos de Venezuela (PDV), the national oil company. Venezuela’s formerly strong 
political parties, AD and COPEI, also had strong views on Venezuela’s place in the 
international system, but their collapse has removed them from the cast of keepers of 
national strategic culture. The political movements affiliated with President Hugo Chávez 
have views of international affairs that are shaped by the national strategic culture, but 
they have adopted an ideological worldview that is quite distant from the national 
strategic culture and is instead attuned to the anti-imperialist views of the president. 
On the other hand, some institutions that might act as keepers of strategic culture 
in other states are not relevant in Venezuela. The foreign and interior ministries, 
associated with borders, internal stability, and external security, have little to contribute 
to the national strategic culture since they have been traditionally quite politicized 
throughout Venezuelan history and thus reflected the strategic culture of whatever the 
ruling political class was at the time. The political opposition to President Chávez is so 
focused on the domestic political struggle for survival and is so new (emerging only since 
1999) that the opposition’s perceptions of strategic culture do not differ notably from that 
of the mass public. Economic elites, normally relevant to political culture in many states, 
have less of an impact on strategic culture in the Venezuelan case since the importance of 
oil in the national economy has made them largely dependent on the government for 
success. Venezuela’s economic classes have therefore developed a very flexible and 
pragmatic worldview that generally accommodates changing ideologies.15 
 The armed forces have been one of the few modern institutions to think relatively 
consistently about strategic issues, and as such, they have acquired and reproduced a 
strategic culture, at least in modern times. The current armed forces were founded by 
General Gómez in 1911 with the creation of a modern military academy. He originally 
used them to establish the predominance of the central government and defeat regional 
warlords, thereby embedding within the Venezuelan military a deep concern for internal 
stability. The Venezuelan armed forces have traditionally considered themselves as 
                                                 
15 Garcia Prince 2009. 
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having close ties to the general public and its values, and this is reflected in their inward 
looking and defensive strategic orientation.16  
To the extent that the Venezuelan armed forces have a traditional strategic 
competitor, that is Colombia, the military sees its main external role as preserving 
Venezuela’s territorial integrity and defending its maritime claims against this traditional 
threat. The one area where the Venezuelan armed forces do see a justification for the use 
of force is in defense of national territorial integrity, and this is one of the few issues that 
they have been willing to “go to the mat” for historically, as occurred when the military 
blocked Venezuela politicians from ratifying a border treaty with Colombia in the late 
1970s, and again when the armed forces mobilized for war against Colombia over a 
maritime border incursion in 1987 (the Caldas incident). From the perspective of the 
Venezuelan military, the best way to preserve territorial integrity is to maintain a regional 
balance of power that would dissuade Colombia from offensive operations. In other 
words, performing defensive preparations and using diplomacy to maintain a regional 
status quo is necessary, rather than strictly planning for offensive operations against their 
neighbor.17  
The armed forces also see themselves in a heroic mold, contributing to the 
founding of the republic and the development of the nation. The Army’s motto, “Forjador 
de Libertades” (Forger of Liberties), encapsulates their worldview. It also highlights the 
importance of the heroic independence struggle and the role of Simón Bolívar’s actions 
and writings in their institutional mythology. The achievements of Bolívar set a high 
standard for the institution to be inspired by and, parenthetically, can be used to justify a 
broad degree of military engagement in Venezuela’s internal affairs. It is worth noting 
that one of the sources of military discontent during the democratic period that preceded 
the Chávez regime was the shifting of the military away from internal development and 
security roles (where the military could work directly with the people) and toward 
conventional defense (since they were unlikely to fight a war). For this reason, the 
developmentalist role President Chávez assigned the military upon taking office made 
him initially popular among officers and soldiers.  
                                                 
16 See Irwin and Micett, 2008. 
17 Felix Martin, “The Strategic Culture of Venezuela: Challenges, Continuity, and Change,” paper prepared for 
Venezuela Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, June 5, 2009. 
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 Venezuela’s oil establishment also acted as a bearer of strategic culture, and one 
that in fact differed from that of other state elites and the strategic culture held by the 
general public. Venezuela’s national oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), 
inherited the Anglo/Dutch/American strategic culture of the international oil companies 
Royal Dutch Shell and Creole (a Standard Oil subsidiary). Unlike Mexico, the 
nationalization of the Venezuela oil industry did not lead to the dissolution of the existing 
operating entities, merely their renaming and the substitution of foreign-led management 
with a Venezuelan board of directors drawn from the ranks of the next generation of 
managers within the local Shell and Standard Oil subsidiaries. Their strategic culture 
focused on making Venezuela a dominant oil producer through development of high 
volume of production, high levels of technical prowess, R&D, and efficiency. In other 
words, they wanted to out-compete the international oil companies from which they had 
sprung. However, this ran counter to the perspectives held by the political class, which 
saw oil as something that should be sold in low quantities at high cost to stretch out the 
benefit to the state (hence, OPEC). Similarly, the military viewed oil as a national 
strategic asset that should be used to benefit Venezuela rather than as an instrument for 
the PDVSA to attain international standing. These debates were finally settled when 
President Chávez fired nearly 20,000 managers and technicians from PDVSA in 2004 
over their participation in a national general strike. Since then, PDVSA has ceased to be 
the bearer of a strategic culture that differs notably from that of other elites.18 
 The modern political parties that led Venezuela between 1958 and 1998, COPEI 
and Accion Democratica (AD), also reflected a version of the national strategic culture 
that focused on diplomatic engagement with the world, viz., by leveraging petrodollars in 
a bid to win Venezuela outsized influence over decisions made by the international 
community. It is these parties (although each had a somewhat different perspective) that 
pursued a foreign policy that created OPEC, supported democratization across the world, 
and called for the reordering of the international system to favor the developing world 
through leadership in the Non-Aligned Movement. A snapshot of Venezuela’s 
international activism can be seen by examining its role in Central America, where it 
                                                 
18 Harold Trinkunas, “Energy Security: The Case of Venezuela,” in Daniel Moran and James A. Russell, eds., Energy 
Security and Global Politics: The Militarization of Resource Management. Routledge, New York, 2008. 
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funded the overthrow of Somoza in Nicaragua, funded the government of President 
Duarte against the FMLN in El Salvador during the 1980s, funded and led the Contadora 
group negotiating for peace in Central America during the same period, and then 
supported President Chamorro during her leadership of Nicaragua’s transition back to 
democracy in the 1990s. These parties were not only seeking to translate Venezuela’s oil 
production into international power, but they were seeking to do so in that context of a 
general strategic culture that favored a role for Venezuela in promoting liberty.19 
Although these parties have largely disappeared in terms of their electoral influence, 
elements of the strategic culture they bore can be found threaded through the 
international strategies of both the Chavista and opposition political parties in Venezuela. 
 The coalescence of political movements around President Hugo Chávez is a 
relatively recent phenomenon (little more than a decade), but it is important to point out 
the ways in which the national strategic culture is reflected in the types of international 
policies such movements pursue. It is also important to distinguish between strategic 
culture (a shared national predisposition towards the appropriate uses of power in the 
international arena) and ideology (a more or less coherent or consistent body of ideas 
about how to solve social and political problems, including international ones). 
Venezuela’s Bolivarian foreign policy defines itself as anti-imperialist, anti-
neoliberalism, anti-globalization, and in favor of twenty-first century socialism and 
participatory democracy. It has both minimum and maximum objectives. The minimum 
objective is to defend the Bolivarian revolution in Venezuela. The maximum objective is 
to work toward a multi-polar world in which US hegemony is checked and Venezuela 
leads one of the poles consisting of an alliance of Latin American states.20 How does this 
ideological approach fit with the national strategic culture? 
President Chávez and his political movement reflect the Venezuelan strategic 
culture to the extent that they appeal to heroic visions of a Venezuela that has outsized 
influence in Latin America, that critiques the present world order as unfair, that uses its 
petrodollars to achieve international objectives, and promotes political allies in Latin 
                                                 
19 Harold Trinkunas, “The Logic of Venezuelan Foreign Policy during the Chávez Period,” paper prepared for 
conference, Ten Years of Venezuelan Foreign Policy: Impacts on the Hemisphere and the World, Florida International 




America through the use of its diplomatic and economic power. These are elements of the 
Chavista worldview that are clearly in tune with the national strategic culture. 
  In other areas, it is clear that ideology trumps strategic culture. There are several 
areas where this can be observed.  The first is the anti-imperialist dimension of 
Venezuelan foreign policy that challenges the status quo embodied in the international 
system. Venezuelan strategic culture has traditionally been defensive and inward looking, 
so challenging the status of the great powers that order the international system has not 
been one of its historical objectives. Rather, Venezuela has usually tried to work within 
the system to achieve the best economic and political deal possible for itself.  
A second area (and a corollary to the first) has been to identify the United States 
as the most important external threat to Venezuela’s sovereignty, self-determination, and 
potential for greatness.  Having never been invaded by the United States, Venezuelans do 
not have a historic strategic culture tinged with anti-Americanism, and Chavismo has had 
to work hard to convince the general population (so far unsuccessfully) that the US was, 
and still remains, a real threat.21 President Chávez has even appealed to Simón Bolívar to 
justify this attitude (and the Liberator was suspicious of US intentions late in his life), but 
this is part of the Bolivarian philosophy that never had much cultural penetration in 
Venezuela. It is true that the US strategic posture during the 2000s and the war in Iraq 
were unpopular in Venezuela, which gave the anti-American message some traction 
during the first decade of the Chávez regime. However, the advent of a new 
administration in the United States and the winding down of the war in Iraq will most 
likely undercut this message further.22   
The third area where ideology has trumped national strategic culture has been that 
Venezuela under President Chávez has sought out non-traditional allies, frequently 
among autocratic states, to help counterbalance the power and influence of the United 
States. This is seen as a way to both deter any threat to the survival of the Bolivarian 
Revolution and to prevent the US from checking Venezuela’s global influence. This 
policy includes arms purchases from Russia, economic deals with China, and strategic 
                                                 
21 “Continuidad y Cambio en la Cultura Estratégica Venezolana,” paper prepared for Venezuela Strategic Culture 
Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, June 5, 2009. 
22 See “La ‘cultura estratégica’ en Venezuela,” paper prepared for Venezuela Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida 
International University, Miami, June 5, 2009. 
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partnerships with Iran and Cuba. Within Venezuelan strategic culture, none of these 
states are seen as natural allies, particularly those that fall outside the Latin American 
region. While President Chávez’s efforts to seek greater Latin American unity or achieve 
leadership within the region resonate with the national strategic culture due to the legacy 
of Bolívar, these international alliances do not.23 
The fourth and final area where ideology has trumped Venezuelan traditional 
strategic culture is in the regime’s perspective on popular participation in national 
defense. One of the fundamental principles of Bolivarian ideology is to create a civil-
military union. This means that the armed forces should participate as an integral 
component of national development, and citizens and civil society should be co-
responsible with the state for national defense and security.24 Civilian governmental 
entities down to the level of the Consejos Comunales (sub-municipal level governing 
entities) have assigned defense responsibilities. President Chávez has also called for the 
creation of a multi-million person national militia, and ordered a series of military 
exercises that incorporate civilians in support of military units defending against foreign 
invasion.25  While there has been some popular participation in these measures, there is 
by no means widespread enthusiasm, which is understandable given that the national 
strategic culture assigns responsibility for defense to the armed forces. 
Strategic Culture Among the Venezuelan Mass Public  
 The strategic culture of the general public in Venezuela is much more skeptical 
about the wisdom of international entanglements than its elite culture. In fact, despite ten 
years of concerted effort by the Chávez regime to mold public opinion in favor of its anti-
imperialist and activist Bolivarian foreign policy, there is little evidence of significant 
shifts in mass strategic culture that would support such a stance. Although cross-temporal 
polling data is not available on all the possible questions associated with defense and 
international affairs, what is available is highly suggestive and supports the conclusion 
that Venezuelan strategic culture is defensive, inward looking, and opposed to significant 
                                                 
23 Javier Corrales, “Changes in Regime Type and Venezuela’s New Foreign Policy,” paper prepared for Venezuela 
Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, June 5, 2009. 
24 See Miriam Kornblith, “Principios y Guardianes de la Cultura Estratégica,” paper prepared for Venezuela Strategic 
Culture Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, June 5, 2009. 
25 Trinkunas 2009. 
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or expensive international commitments. This poses significant problems for Chavista 
foreign policy insofar as it wants or needs to have public approval for its actions. 
 One of the most important observations about the mass strategic culture is the 
rejection of war as a solution for international problems. Over 75% of the public in recent 
polls rejected the idea of preparing for war with the United States. Nearly 85% of the 
public reacted negatively to the proposal to use Venezuelan troops to defend the Bolivian 
government, as President Chávez has proposed. Over 60% of the Venezuelan public also 
rejects new military acquisitions, another indication that it does not favor war as a 
solution. Similarly, the Venezuelan public generally does not favor other states’ wars 
either, with over 75% rejecting the U.S. war in Iraq. This reflects the view in the mass 
strategic culture that war is not the answer. 
The general attitude of Venezuelans towards the United States (designated as 
threat #1 by Chavismo) is that it would be simply irrational to fight with the United 
States, and that the United States falls more into the category of a significant power with 
which Venezuela should have good relations. Historically, Venezuela has looked to the 
United States for assistance during key crises, and this is the attitude of many in the 
political opposition in their struggle with the Chávez regime. The general attitude 
towards the United States is supported by the finding that, in October 2008, only 20% of 
Venezuelans supported the idea of breaking diplomatic relations with the United States 
(as President Chávez periodically threatens to do). 
 Similarly, Venezuelan mass public opinion rejects foreign entanglements. The 
notion of hosting Russian or Chinese military bases was rejected by over 80% in recent 
polls (as was the idea of hosting US military bases). The use of Venezuelan funds for 
development purposes in other countries or to support the Bolivian military was also 
rejected by large majorities. Even President Chávez’s frequent foreign travel was 
criticized, although this only by a bare majority of respondents. 
 In addition to the opposition to war and foreign entanglements, Venezuelans 
generally favor peaceful solutions to conflict, even those that involve their traditional 
rival, Colombia. It is worth noting that 60% of Venezuelans favor a role for their 
government in negotiating a peaceful settlement of the Colombian internal conflict, 
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although their sympathies are pretty clearly against the FARC, with only 18% opposing 
the label of the FARC as a terrorist organization. 
 Although these recent (2007-2008) polling data suggest that Venezuela’s 
defensive and inward-looking strategic culture still prevails, we should keep in mind that 
15-20% of the Venezuelan population does support the most controversial foreign policy 
proposals of President Chávez. This suggests that Chavista foreign policy plays well to 
the hard line partisans in the movement, but less well with the moderate supporters (45-
55%) that consistently support the President on domestic policy issues and help him win 
elections.26 However, the hard line component of the movement is important to the 
President’s political success since these are the activists most likely to turn out to support 
political campaigns, participate in the “misiones,” and defend the revolution in the streets, 
if necessary, as occurred during the 2002 coup attempt. 
 In addition, Venezuelan history suggests that, even though the general population 
is quite pacifist and inward looking, there have been strong popular reactions in cases 
where there is a foreign threat to national territorial integrity. The most recent event to 
integrity, which helps to explain the almost universal rejection of foreign bases from any 
spark such a reaction was the incursion of a Colombian corvette, the ARC Caldas, into 
Venezuelan territorial waters in 1987. The general public strongly supported the 
government’s defensive measures along the border with Colombia, and there was a 
jingoistic tone to popular opinion about its neighbor. In other words, Venezuelans are 
pacifist to a notable extent, but quite passionate about defending their country’s territorial 
outside power as noted previously.27 
Enduring Rivalries and Emerging Problems for the Chávez 
Administration 
 
 Venezuela’s strategic culture poses a significant challenge for the Chávez 
administration in dealing with both the enduring rivalry with Colombia and the emerging 
challenges of confronting the United States. Other significant challenges involve dealing 
with the rapidly rising power of Brazil, and keeping the Bolivarian alliance together. In 
                                                 
26 Statistics in this section drawn from “La “cultura estratégica” en Venezuela,” in paper prepared for Venezuela 
Strategic Culture Workshop, Florida International University, Miami, June 5, 2009. 
27 Martin 2009. 
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each case, Venezuela’s strategic culture increases the cost, in terms of public opinion, of 
finding solutions acceptable to the Chávez regime for each of these issues. 
 The key international rivalry in Venezuelan strategic culture is Colombia. The 
armed forces have always seen Colombia as the peer-competitor against which to plan 
their strategies, acquisitions, and infrastructure. Venezuelans imagine Colombians to be 
much tougher, more violent, and more likely to use force than they are. They are also 
seen as having possibly predatory ambitions with regards to key areas of Venezuela’s 
land and sea borders. This mindset persists despite decades of Colombian migration to 
Venezuela, considerable cross-border trade and integration, and a substantial degree of 
cultural similarity in the Andean regions of the two states. President Uribe’s tough stance 
on insurgents and paramilitary actors, the attack on the FARC base in Ecuador, and the 
generally conservative, security oriented tenor of his government reinforce this image of 
Colombia as a state that is more prone to aggression and war than Venezuela. 
 On the one hand, this presents an advantage for President Chávez whenever he 
takes a hard stance vis-à-vis the Uribe government since Venezuelans are often prepared 
to think the worst of Colombians. Even his verbal and covert support for the FARC does 
not generate too much controversy, despite the average Venezuelan thinking less well of 
the FARC than they do of the rest of their neighbors. As long as Chávez publicly cloaks 
his relations with the FARC in terms of trying to achieve lasting peace in Colombia, this 
is generally acceptable to most Venezuelans since they do not believe that armed 
confrontation is a solution to their neighbor’s internal conflict. However, the defensive 
strategic culture of Venezuelans does not support more overt aggressive moves against 
Colombia either, and the very sudden and negative public reaction to Venezuelan 
escalation against Colombia following the bombing of the FARC base in Ecuador is 
evidence of this. This suggests that by far the least politically costly way for President 
Chávez to oppose the Uribe administration’s policies is covertly, through support for the 
FARC and other political actors hostile to the Colombian government.28 
 Venezuelan strategic culture also poses a challenge to President Chávez’s 
handling of relations with the United States. All the elite keepers of strategic culture 
except the Chavista political movement evaluate the US in a positive light. At the mass 
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level, Venezuelans are one of the largest consumers of US material and cultural products 
in the Western Hemisphere. The economic dependency of Venezuela on the US has 
deepened during the past decade, and no amount of fulmination by President Chávez 
against the United States has been able to reduce Venezuelan consumption of US culture 
in various forms through the medium of movies, television, baseball, music, et cetera. 
Traditionally, Venezuelans have been one of the least anti-American of Latin American 
societies, and while this sentiment has grown, particularly among the hard line supporters 
of President Chávez, it simply cannot get much traction within the general public. It is 
true that a larger number of Venezuelans held a negative evaluation of the Bush 
administration, but pollsters in Venezuela suggest that this almost entirely due to the Iraq 
war (i.e. Venezuelans are against all wars) than any growth in anti-American sentiment. 
 The positive image of the United States in Venezuela’s strategic culture makes it 
very difficult for Venezuelans to take the notion of war between the two countries 
seriously. This means that President Chávez’s generally confrontational line with the 
United States, complete with accusations of coup conspiracies, assassination plots, and 
the like, does not play particularly well with the general public. It also means that it is 
difficult to convince the keepers of elite strategic culture, particularly the military, to 
seriously prepare for a military confrontation with the United States.29 
 The rising power of Brazil is also a challenge for President Chávez’s ambitions 
for regional leadership in Latin America. Brazil’s economy is growing steadily and 
diversifying rapidly. Brazil is more technologically autonomous, wealthier, and has a 
much broader range of capabilities than Venezuela. Moreover, Brazil is increasingly 
recognized by other great powers, particularly the United States, as a rising power that is 
generally supportive of the existing international order. President Lula’s generally 
temperate and even-handed government, including foreign relations, contributes to this 
sense of Brazil as the most important player in Latin America’s international politics. 
Moreover, Brazilian strategic elites do not take the notion of Venezuelan leadership in the 
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International University, Miami, June 5, 2009. 
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region seriously, and in fact, consider President Chávez’s ambitions in this area either 
irritating or amusing.30 
 This poses a problem for President Chávez since he would prefer for Venezuela to 
be the leading state in the region. However, he is unable to exert much leverage over 
Brazil, which is much too prosperous for Venezuela’s petrodollars to make much 
difference, nor is Brazil’s regional leadership considered a serious problem in 
Venezuela’s strategic culture. Brazil is probably the only neighboring country with which 
Venezuelans do not associate a history of territorial disputes or border predation.31 The 
Amazon is seen as an impenetrable shield against Brazilian power in any event. So, if 
President Chávez wanted to rally Venezuelans against the rising power of Brazil, he 
would face an uphill climb against a strategic culture that does not consider Brazil a 
relevant threat. 
 The final obstacle posed by Venezuelan strategic culture for President Chávez’s 
foreign policy is in the area of holding together the Bolivarian alliance he has created. On 
the one hand, the heroic strain in Venezuelan strategic culture does support an activist 
foreign policy, particularly as conceptualized by the elite keepers of strategic culture. On 
the other hand, mass strategic culture leads Venezuelans to be suspicious of foreign 
entanglements and to oppose the expenditure of too many resources on such relations. 
From this perspective, excessive spending on foreign adventures detracts from addressing 
pressing problems at home. This type of thinking is particularly prevalent whenever the 
price of oil drops or the economy turns sour. However, the recent coup in Honduras 
highlights another wrinkle posed by Venezuelan strategic culture, which is an aversion to 
conflict or to using Venezuelan troops abroad. Public opinion rejects the notion of using 
Venezuelan troops to defend President Evo Morales of Bolivia, and there is little reason 
to suspect that there would be a different view of the situation in Honduras. This means 
that, when President Chávez tries to use his military capabilities to support his foreign 
policy, as occurred during the Ecuador-Colombia border incident in March 2008, or 
threatens to do so, as occurred during the internal tensions in Bolivia over the approval of 
                                                 
30 Some Venezuelan Presidents, such as Rafael Caldera (1969-74) have tried to rally Spanish-speaking countries in the 
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31 Occasionally, there have been irritants such as the environmental damage caused by wildcat Brazilian miners along 
the Amazon border that have attracted public attention, but there is no consistent history of territorial tension as has 
been the case with Colombia.  
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new constitution, he consistently runs into a roadblock on negative public opinion. Given 
the importance of elections for President Chávez’s strategy of staying in power, negative 
public opinion is a serious cost worth taking into account when crafting foreign policy. 
Continuity and Change in Venezuelan Strategic Culture 
 In Venezuela today, strategic culture acts as a constraint, or a source of friction, 
on the policies of the Chavez regime. In a sense, strategic culture is a menu or repertoire 
of preferred international behaviors or policies available in a given state, and in 
Venezuela, this menu does not offer many options that fit President Chávez’s policies. 
Despite the best efforts of the Chávez regime to realign the national strategic culture to 
make it more compatible with its international ideology, Venezuelans continue to take a 
defensive, almost pacifist, attitude towards international affairs. They oppose war and are 
suspicious of foreign entanglements. Key elites favor a more activist policy, but most of 
them prefer the use of economic and diplomatic tools rather than military ones to achieve 
international objectives. The following table summarizes the high degree of continuity in 
the attitudes of key actors towards the use of national power in international affairs. 
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 By going against the grain of the national strategic culture, Chavista foreign 
policy runs the risk of misfires. The distance between mass strategic culture and the 
Chavista ideological preferences on international affairs is a major vulnerability because 
the regime risks losing support and losing popularity whenever it engages in radical 
foreign policy adventures. The negative public opinion impact of the Venezuelan 
escalation of the Ecuador-Colombia crisis in 2008 is a recent example of such the 
disconnection between the regime and mass strategic culture.  
However, what is changing in Venezuela is the extent to which strategic culture, 
especially mass strategic culture, influences or places limits on the decision-making of 
the regime. Here, changes in the nature of the regime, the role of key state institutions, 
and the evolution of the party system are all moving in the direction that excludes the 
influence of non-Chavista actors and traditional keepers of strategic culture on defense 
and foreign policy. This is the product of a deliberate effort by the Chávez regime to 
eliminate checks and balances and bring the institutions that act as keepers of strategic 
culture under its control and remold them to support its foreign policy strategy.  
 While Venezuela retains an electoral regime, it has become progressively 
authoritarian over the last decade. The efforts by the Chávez administration to reverse 
opposition victories in the recent state and local elections by developing institutional 
mechanisms for defunding and disempowering newly-elected opposition figures, and 
harassing the opposition, are only the latest indication of this trend. Many of the papers 
submitted to the Venezuela Strategic Culture working group contain evidence of this 
authoritarian trend. The legislature and the judiciary no longer exercise significant 
powers to check the executive.  The national electoral council is widely seen as biased 
towards the regime. The government has access to large amounts of off-budget funding 
that is spent in non-transparent and unaccountable ways. The routine ability of the 
President to issue decrees to accomplish his objectives, even those that have been rejected 
by voters in referenda, contributes to this sense of a lack of checks and balances on 
presidential power. This is especially true in the area of foreign policy, where there are 
literally no checks on what the President can do other than popular reaction. A lack of 
checks and balances reduces the impact of strategic culture as an explanation for foreign 
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policy decisions since these would naturally reflect the personal and ideological 
convictions of an individual rather than a political class as a whole.32 
 In addition, President Chávez has deliberately undermined the autonomy of and 
taken control of the most autonomous institutions in the state, that is, the military and 
PDV, which also happen to be the main keepers of strategic culture. After the failure of 
the 2002 coups, the military lost all vestiges of autonomy, and the regime exercised 
increasing ideological control over the armed forces. Although the new military salute, 
“Patria, socialismo o muerte,” garnered the most publicity, the regime has also been able 
to enforce public compliance among officers with the ideological precepts of the regime. 
To this is added the increased funding for military activities and lucrative opportunities 
for self-enrichment through participation in acquisitions and development projects. Given 
its druthers, the contemporary military strategic culture would still prefer a defensive role 
focused on internal development and security, would favor Western rather than Russian 
equipment and doctrine, and would consider the idea of war with the United States 
ludicrous.33 However, its preferences (and strategic culture) are no longer relevant to the 
decision-making of the regime. Similarly, the purge of the technical and managerial ranks 
of PDV following the 2003 general strike deprived the organization of the key leadership 
personnel that were the keepers of a world-class, highly competitive strategic culture 
centered on energy. The new leadership of PDV is entirely Chavista in its orientation, and 
PDV has become a major bankroller and executing agent for the regime. In this case, it is 
not possible to even speak of latent strategic culture as is the case in the military. 
 Finally, the evolution of the party system in Venezuela is such that it is 
impossible for the political class to place any checks on the regime. President Chávez is 
still the political hegemon of the Chavista movement, and no rivals have emerged from 
within these ranks that could possible overshadow him or even check his policies. The 
political opposition in Venezuela remains disorganized and is correctly focused on 
figuring out how to win elections. Foreign policy is low on the opposition’s political 
agenda, and, given its low representation in elected offices and the successful Chavista 
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efforts to undermine the power of elected opposition leaders, this is not a check to 
President Chávez’s foreign policy objectives.34 
Conclusion 
 Venezuelan strategic culture remains defensive and inward-looking, despite 
President Chávez’s rhetorical and institutional efforts to make it otherwise. The 
ideological orientation of Venezuela’s Bolivarian foreign policy is a poor fit with the 
country’s strategic culture. In addition, Venezuelan strategic culture does not support the 
use of military power vis-à-vis other countries, particularly the United States. While 
Venezuelans like to have the self-image of taking a leading role in regional affairs, this 
does not translate into support for significant economic or military commitments. This 
poses a challenge to President Chávez’s international strategy, and it introduces friction 
in the form of negative public opinion whenever this strategy leads to confrontation. 
President Chávez has made considerable progress in eliminating institutional 
checks and balances pertaining to his control over foreign policy. He has also dominated 
the institutional keepers of strategic culture in Venezuela, enforcing the Chavista 
ideological orientation on the military and petroleum sectors. The Venezuelan party 
system, particularly as regards the opposition, is so weak that it does not pose a 
significant obstacle to President Chávez’s foreign policy ambitions. This means that, at 
the elite level, Venezuela’s traditional strategic culture is not a dominant factor in 
explaining foreign policy decision-making.  
There is a recurring phenomenon of caudillismo in Venezuelan history. By 
breaking down the institutional and political checks of the democratic period, President 
Hugo Chavez has liberated himself from many constraints and become the indispensable 
figure in the political movement he leads. However, the menu of preferred international 
policy options that makes up a strategic culture remains latent in the general population 
and among some elite keepers of the strategic culture, especially the armed forces. This 
will remain a recurrent source of friction in Venezuela. As long as the regime, no matter 
how authoritarian, continues to need electoral victories to retain power, negative public 
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opinion about foreign policy adventures will remain a factor in President Chávez’s 
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